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NOTES AND COMMENT
NECEssiTY oF NOTICE TOA MUICIPAL CORPORATI ON TO RENDER IT
LIABiE FOR DEFECTS n ITs STREETS. A municipal corporation is
not an insurer of its streets ;1 and is not obliged to so construct and
maintain them as to secure absolute nnmunity from any danger in
using them. Generally stated, its duty is to exercise ordinary care
to keep them in a reasonably safe condition for public travel;2
this duty being in some states imposed by statute, and in others,
arising by mere implication. The Washington rule is well illus-
trated by the case of Sutton v. Snohomish,4 in which the court said.
ITeater v. Seattle, 10 Wash. 327, 38 Pac. 1006 (1894).
S utton v. Snohomish, 1 Wash. 24, 39 Pao. 273, 48 Am. St. Rep. 849
(1895) Lorence v. Ellensburg, 13 Wash. 341, 43 Pac. 20, 52 Am. St. Rep.
42 (1896) Mischeke v. Seattle, 26 Wash. 616, 67 Pac. 357 (1901).
3 Chapman v. Milton, 31 W Va. 384, 7 S. E. 27 (1888). (Statute of W
Va. imposes absolute liability, and proof of notice is unnecessary), Wit-
ney v. Lowell, 151 Mass. 212, 24 N. D. 47, 20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 692 (1890)
Lansing v. Toolan, 37 Mich. 152 (1877) Chape v. Eureka, 78 Cal. 588, 21
Pao. 364, 4 L. R. A. 327 (1889). (California recognizes no duty imposed on
the city to make repairs except where expressly imposed by statute.)
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"Where a city has exclusive control and management of
its streets with power to raise money for their constructaon
and repair, a duty arises to the public from the character
of the powers granted to keep its streets in a reasonably
safe condition for use in the ordinary modes of travel, and
the city is liable to respond in damages to those injured by
a neglect to perform such duty "
Negligence in the performance of that duty is the basis of cor-
porate liability And where injury is the result of neglect to keep
streets in repair, or remove obstructions, or remedy causes of danger
occasioned by third parties, it is the general rule that the muni-
cipality will be liable, only if it has notice of such condition, such
notice being either express or implied, actual or constructive5
However, no notice is essential to the liability of a municipality
when liability is predicated on its own or its officers' or agents'
positive misfeasance in doing acts causing the streets to become
out of repair and dangerous.6 This, for the reason that a munici-
pality is chargeable with knowledge of its own acts, or those ordered
by it, as where work is done under a contract, or as some cases hold
where the defect is created by persons under a license or permit
from the city Thus, where injury was due to the fact that the
street had been negligently constructed or defects were inherent
in the plan of construction, the city was liable therefore without
notice.7 The duty to keep the streets in a safe condition rests pri-
marily upon the municipality and can be neither delegated nor
evaded." The Washington court in the case of Jefferson v. Chap-
man9 in discussing the application of the rule of respondeat superior
to independent contractors, stated
"Another exception to the general rule relieving an em-
ployer from liability for an injury occasioned by an inde-
pendent contractor is where the party causing the work to
be done is under a primary obligation, imposed by law, to
keep the subject matter of the work in a safe condition.
The principle upon which this exception is predicated is
that, where a duty is so inposed, the responsibility for its
faithful performance cannot be avoided, and that the
party under such obligation cannot be relieved therefrom
by a contract made with another for the performance of
such duty "
See note 2, supra.
Boulder v. Niles, 9 Colo. 415, 12 Pac. 632 (1886) Doulon v. Clinton,
33 Ia. 397 (1871).
20 L. R. A. (N. S.) 701-705.1 Stone v. Seattle, 30 Wash. 65, 70 Pac. 249, 67 L. R. A. 253 (1902).
'Davzs v. Wenatchee, 86 Wash. 13, 149 Fac. 337 (1915) Drake v. Se-
attle, 30 Wash. 81, 70 Pac. 231, 94 Am. St. Rep. 844 (1902)
'127 Ill. 438, 20 N. E. 33, 11 Am. St. Rep. 136 (1889).
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The Supreme Court of Iowa in the case of Bennett v. Mt. Ver-
non,1 expressed the general rule regarding work done by mde-
pendent contractors in the following language
"If the matter involved was one of positive duty to the
plaintiff, then, of course, the town could not relieve itself
by delegating the work to an independent contractor; or if
the work was intrinsically dangerous, or when properly
done was likely to create a nuisance, the town would be
responsible for any damage resulting therefrom."
However, as is pointed out in the case of Wilton v. Spokane,"
if the defect is entirely the wrongful act of the contractor and is
collateral to the work contracted for, the city is not liable without
notice. The injury complained of in that case was caused by an
unexploded blast which had been left and covered over by the
independent contractors constructing the street.
The weight of authority is to the effect that notice is not neces-
sary where a municipality authorized by license or permit, third
persons to place intrinsically dangerous obstructions in a street,
or to make excavations of a dangerous character. 12 Washington is
in line with this view and in the case of Sutton v. Snohomsh
said.
"The fact that a permit was granted was notice to the
authorities that the work was in progress, and they were
then charged with the duty of seeing it was properly con-
ducted."
There appears to be a contrariety of opinion as to whether a
municipality is chargeable with notice where it issues a permit
to place building material on the street.14 The case of Columbus v.
Penrod"" states the minority view
"An examination of the cases will show that it is only
when the city is the actor, or in cases of license by the city
to do an intrinsically dangerous thing in the street, and not
in the cases properly of mere regulation, that the city is
liable without notice, or is charged with notice by the fact
that it gave the permit to do the thing in the street."
1 124 Ia. 537, 100 N. W 349 (1904).
' 73 Wash. 619, 132 Pac. 404, L. R. A. 1917 D 234 (1913).
"Mcolammy v. Spokane, 36 Wash. 339, 78 Pac. 912 (1904, Lasityr v.
Olympu, 61 Wash. 651, 112 Pac. 752 (1911) Colquohon v. Hoqusam, 120
Wash. 391, 207 Pac. 664 (1922).
12See note 2, supra.
14 46 L. R. A. (N. S.) 332.
Is 73 Ohio St. 209, 76 N. E. 826, 3 L. R. A. (N. S.) 386. 112 Am. St. Rep.
716 (1906).
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It is somewhat doubtful just what the Supreme Court of Wash-
ington would hold on this question. In the case of Apker v.
Hoquiam,'6 it did not rule directly on the point as to whether notice
was essential to liability, but said that the building materials having
remained on the street for a period of thirty days, the city did
have constructive notice of the dangerous condition.
As has been previously stated, notice when necessary to fix liabil-
ity may be either actual or constructive. In various states statutes
and city ordinances have been passed requiring actual or written
notice of a defect to have been received by the city before the
injury occurred. And for the most part they have been upheld
as constitutional.1 7 An Oregon case'8 held that the constitutional
provision that "every man shall have a remedy by due course of
law for injury done him," is subordinate to the doctrine that the
state and its agencies cannot be sued without its consent. Wash-
mgton along with Oklahoma' 9 takes a contrary position. In the
case of Born v. Spokane20 the court ruled that an ordinance pre-
scribing that twenty-four hours' actual notice before injury
occurred must have been given to the city council or street super-
intendent, was unreasonable and void as an interference with the
right to prosecute a claim for personal injuries.
Generally, to constitute actual notice to a city of a defect or an
obstruction in a street, such defect or obstruction must have been
brought to the attention of some officer charged with a duty respect-
ing it. The Washington court in the case of MacDermsd v. Seattle2 '
held that proof of notice to an employee of park commisioners
was not sufficient notice to charge the city when the control and
maintenance of the streets were the duties of the board of public
works. But actual knowledge on the part of a street superintendent
or commissioner was held sufficient to impute notice to the city 22
The question of constructive notice is usually one of fact for the
jury, to be determined by the character and notoriety of the defect,
its location with reference to the amount of travel thereon, and
its duration. It is sufficient to prove that the obstruction or defect
had existed such a length of time that the corporation in the exer-
cise of proper care and diligence should have known and remedied
it. 2 3 There is no fixed and definite rule as to what length of time
is required in order to justify an inference of knowledge, although
some states have attempted to control the same by statute. The
Washington court points out in Peterson v. Seattle2- that "the
11 51 Wash. 567, 99 Pac. 746 (1909)
7 43 C. J. 1822.
:,Platt v. Newburg, 104 Ore. 148, 205 Pac. 296 (1922)
1 Tulsa v. Wells, 79 OkI. 39, 191 Pac. 186 (1920).
20 27 Wash. 719, 68 Pac. 386 (1902).
293 Wash. 167, 160 Pac. 290 (1916).
Saylor v. Montesano, 11 Wash. 328, 39 Pac. (1895).
"Elsterv. Seattle, 18 Wash. 304, 51 Pac. 394 (1897) Peterson v. Seattle,
100 Wash. 618, 171 Pac. 657 (1918)
21 See note 23, supra.
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question of time witln which notice of a defect m a public street
should be imputed to the city is determinable largely from the
circumstances of each particular case." Furthermore it is stated
that a much shorter time is required to charge the city with notice
when the defect occurs on a busy thoroughfare than when it exists
in a sparsely populated suburb of the city 25
An essential element in the doctrine of constructive notice is that
the defect must have been so apparent and patent that it could
have been discovered by the use of reasonable care.28 It was held
in the case of Short v. Spokane2 7 that a muniipality could not be
charged with notice of a defect unless it was so obvious as to attract
the attention of people in the habit of passing there, although they
need not have actually noticed it. H6wever, the duty of a mum-
cipality in the care of its streets involves the anticipation of
defects that are the natural results of use and climatic influences,
and where there is a neglect of the officers to make frequent inspec-
tion of a structure, the city will not be relieved because the fact
was not known or patent.28 In the case of Billings v. Snohomssh2 9
it was held that it was the duty of city officers to take notice that
constant use will gradually wear out a walk, and at best, the life
of a wooden sidewalk is limited to but a few years; and that it was
not enough that they might find that the surface of the walk
appeared sound but they should have examined it as an entirety
Notice of general defectiveness of a street at a certain place will
be sufficient to charge the municipality with negligence in not
repairing a particular defect therein causing the injury if the gen-
eral defect was of the same general character as the particular one,
or in any way related thereto. Thus, if the city had notice of a
general bad condition of a sidewalk, it is nmaterial whether it
knew of the actual hole causing the injury or whether such hole was
caused by the plaintiff when the injury occurred.80 It was also
held in the case of Dallas v. Moore8 ' that where there is an obvious
defect so nearly and closely related to a condition which is appar-
ently safe, but in fact defective that an investigation of the former
would lead to knowledge of the latter, it may then be said that the
city shall have had notice of the latter defect.
21 Where a fill had settled after a rain and the depression had existed
for only four or five hours, it was held that this was not sufficient time
from which notice might be imputed, Chase v. Seattle, 80 Wash. 61, 141
Pac. 180, 46 L. R.A. (N. S.) 332 (1914).
Silva v. Somerville, 253 Mass. 545, 149 N. E. 410 (1925) DuBozs V.
Pancoast, 218 Fed. 60, 133 C. C. A. 662 (1914)
2141 Wash. 257, 83 Pac. 183 (1905).
43 C. J. 1055, Denver v. Dean, 10 Colo. 375, 16 Pac. 30, 3 Am. St. R. 594
(1887).
51 Wash. 135, 98 Pac. 107 (1908).
Durham v. Spokane, 27 Wash. 615, 68 Pac. 383 (1902).
Tex. Civ. App. 230, 74 S. W 95 (1903).
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When a city has notice of a condition from which defects proxi-
mately follow, such condition may be considered by the jury in
determining whether the city might have obtained knowledge of
the defects. Thus, in the case of Hayes v. Seattle," where a person
was injured by falling into an opening in the sidewalk caused by
trap-doors having been raised, the court held that the city should
have known that the opening was a menace to every one passing,
and it was immaterial whether the city had notice of such use at
the time in question. Under the same state of facts, the Montana
court in the case of Sweeny v. Butte3 stated
"If the dangerous thing exists for a given use, the city
permitting it to so exist for such use, the city must pre-
sume that it will be so used. These trap-doors and this
opening, in this case, were for a given use, and the city cer-
tainly cannot avoid liability by demanding that it be
notified every time the dangerous thing is put to the use
intended and contemplated by its existence and construc-
tion. "
The recent case of Gabrtelson v. Seattle 4 also presents an inter-
esting situation. The city permitted the partial closing of a busy
thoroughfare during building operations, thus confining the street
traffic at a particular point to a considerably narrowed way As
a result the natural accumulation of oil and grease concentrated in
this narrowed area, thus producing, as the jury found, a dangerous
condition existing over the period of a month. A car skidded at
that point due to this oil and grease, and caused the injury com-
plained of. The court in holding the city liable, said
"The city must exercise reasonable diligence in keeping
its streets safe for ordinary travel, and is liable to answer
for injuries arising from unusual conditions causing them
to become unsafe, whatever may be the nature of the con-
ditwsn which gives rise to the cause. In this instance, there-
fore, if the narrowed space did cause an undue accumula-
tion of oil and grease thereon, the city was bound to antici-
pate the hazards incident to the users of the streets would
be increased, and is bound to answer for an injury arising
thereon of which the increased hazard was the proxi-
mate cause, or one of the proximate causes, if there were
more than one. "
43 Wash. 500, 86 Pac. 852, 11 Am. St. Rep. 1062, 7 L. R. A. (N. S.) 424(1906). The same principle was again laid down in the case of Tubb v.
Seattle, 136 Wash. 332, 239 Pac. 1009 (1925).
3315 Mont. 274, 39 Pac. 286 (1895).
"50 Wash. Dec. 83, 272 Pac. 723 (1928)
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This decision is apparently sound upon the facts of the case, the
city having permitted the partial obstruction of the street was
justly held bound to anticipate a dangerous condition which might
naturally follow. However, it is equally evident as the court points
out that such a ruling should not be applied to a case where the
injury results from an ordinary accumulation of oil and grease
upon the streets, for to so hold would make the city a guarantor
of conditions which are the natural incidents to the use of the
streets, conditions which drivers of automobiles are bound to risk.
Another point to be considered in the doctrine of constructive
notice is that evidence of prior accidents caused by the dangerous
condition is competent as tending to show that proper officials had
notice thereof.35 The reason for this is that experience indicates
that the publicity necessarily given these accidents is such that
notice of them generally is communicated to some officer charged
with a duty in respect to repairing the streets.
To summarize, it may be said generally that when an injury occurs
as a prommate result of some negligent act of the city, or some one
under its direction and control, i. e., independent contractors,
licensees to obstruct the streets, etc., the city is chargeable with
notice by reason of its own participation. Neither actual nor con-
structive notice is necessary But where the city is not a partici-
pant, either directly or indirectly in producing the cause of the
injury, its liability can only be predicated on notice, either actual
or constructive. PHmYLIS CAVENDER.
THE ADMISSIEILITY Op TESTIMONY CONCERNING TRANsAcTIoNs
WIT DECEDEmNS. This is written to supplement the article appear-
mg In 1 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEw 21 on this subject, and covers
all the Washington decisions thereon from Volume 133 to and in-
eluding Volume 153.
Since the former article was written the 1927 Legislature amended
the statute2 by adding the words "or in his presence" after the
words "or any statement made to him." The object of this amend-
ment was merely to make the language of the statute conform to
the interpretation previously given to it by the Supreme Court in
Nicholson v. Kilbury,3 where it was held that although the statute
did not expressly exclude testimony as to statements made by the
2l'Piper -v. Spokane, 22 Wash. 147, 60 Pac. 138 (1900).
'Under heading VIII on page 28 of the former article, "admissible"
should read "inadmissible." Citations of Olsen v. Kernoe on page 32 is
now found in 132 Wash. 250; Perkns v. Allen, under heading C on page 38,
in 133 Wash. 459; and Chaffee v. Morris, under heading XIII on page 43,
Is now found (In re Hebbs' Estate) in 134 Wash. 424, 429, 235 Pac. 974.
The same headings will be used herein as in the former article.
2 Laws of 1927, chap. 84, p. 64. Rem. Comp. Stat., 1927 Sup., Sec. 1211.
' 80 Wash. 500, 141 Pac. 1043 (1914).
